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Yea or Nay: Do Legislators Benefit by Voting Against Their Party?

This article asks whether legislators are able to reap electoral benefits from opposing their party on one or more high-profile issues. Using data from a national survey in which citizens are asked their own positions on seven high-profile issues voted on by the U.S. Senate, as well as how they believe their state's two senators have voted on these issues, I find that senators generally do not benefit from voting against their party. Specifically, when a senator deviates from her party, the vast majority of out-partisans nonetheless persist in believing that the senator voted with her party anyhow; and while the small minority of out-partisans who *are* aware of her deviation are indeed more likely to approve of and vote for such a senator, there are simply too few of these correctly informed citizens for it to make a meaningful difference for the senator's overall support.

Within the study of the contemporary Congress, it is a well-established fact that the best predictor of how a legislator will vote is the party with which she affiliates (see, e.g., Lee 2009; Poole and Rosenthal 2007; Sinclair 2006). At the same time, however, there are still instances in which individual legislators vote against their party's position, especially if they have an electoral incentive to do so (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Fenno 1978; Harden 2013; Mayhew 1974). Indeed, previous research has found that members of Congress (MCs) who represent districts that favor the other party or are evenly split between the two parties are more likely to deviate from the party line than are MCs who hail from districts that are electorally safe for their party (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Bovitz and Carson 2006; Erikson 1990; Hurley and Kerr 2000; Mayhew 2011).

Bolstering these findings, scholars have also shown that members who are less electorally safe make more of an effort to deemphasize their party label when communicating with constituents

(Lipinski 2004) and that candidates for Congress affiliating with the district's less-favored party, whether they are incumbents or challengers, take more centrist ideological positions relative to copartisans running in districts in which that party is favored (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Burden 2004; Stone and Simas 2010).

From this well-established body of research arises a critical question that is the primary focus of this article: Do legislators representing marginal states or districts in which their party is not favored *actually* benefit from taking steps to differentiate themselves from their own party? That is, does employing such a strategy win over at least some voters of the opposite party residing in their constituency? Of course, in order for this to happen, there are two key conditions that must hold: (1) citizens must *be aware* of the fact that their legislator has deviated from her party on some issues; and (2) the voters at whom this strategy is targeted must meaningfully *care about* the fact that a legislator has done so. That is, the opposite-party citizens who should in theory be pleased with the legislator's party-deviating actions must become more approving of the legislator and, more importantly, be willing to vote for the legislator once she comes up for re-election.

In this article, I assess whether these two conditions hold. Simply put, I ask whether legislators can in fact benefit among some opposite-party voters by casting moderate votes whereby they deviate from their own party's position.

Key Findings and Results

Using data from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) in which citizens are asked their own positions on seven high-profile issues voted on by the U.S. Senate during the 109th Congress (2005–06), as well as their perceptions of how each of their two senators voted, I find that senators only marginally benefit among opposite-party constituents when they vote against their own party. Specifically, when a senator deviates from the party line on one or more high-profile votes, opposite-party constituents comprise the subset of voters *least* likely to be aware of such behavior by the legislator. Moreover, among the small subgroup of opposite-party constituents who *do* know about a legislator's party-deviating roll-call behavior, the uptick in electoral support brought about by such knowledge translates into a relatively small electoral benefit, with the *overall* size of the electoral support gained by the legislator being quite minimal.

More briefly, this article also explores the related question of whether a legislator's decision to break with her party carries *negative* consequences for her support among copartisan constituents who disagree with her actions.

In this regard, I find that while a party-bucking senator's copartisan constituents who disagree with the senator's position have a difficult time identifying party-deviating behavior by a senator, they are more likely to notice such actions than their opposite-party counterparts. Further, when such copartisans do notice, they become far less likely to positively evaluate the senator's job performance. Ultimately, my analysis of same-party constituents raises the possibility that party-bucking behavior on the part of a senator may make her more vulnerable to being challenged for renomination by a candidate who hews more closely to party orthodoxy (see Brady, Han, and Pope 2007). At the same time, because the 2006 CCES does not survey voters about their preferences in any congressional primary elections, the notion that lower approval ratings of a party-deviating senator among copartisans will in fact increase the likelihood that the senator receives a future intraparty challenge is at best speculative and should therefore be taken with caution.

Taken together, then, my results lead to the unambiguous conclusion that a senator bucking her party on one or more key issues is a largely ineffective strategy for garnering more votes from out-partisans and, at the same time, offers speculative but nonetheless plausible evidence that it might in fact cause a senator to *lose* support in a future bid for renomination.

Interestingly, such findings extracted from survey data collected in the midst of the 2006 general election appear to be in line with much of what we have observed in the five election cycles that have followed, as the succeeding decade has seen several re-election losses by moderate senators representing states in which their party is not favored, as well as a nontrivial number of serious primary challenges—some of which have succeeded—to senators who compile moderate voting records.

What Do Voters Know About How Their Legislators Vote? Limitations of Previous Research

Recall that the previous section outlined *two* necessary conditions that must hold in order to make a party-deviating strategy by legislators effective in achieving its goal. First, citizens must

know about the legislator's departure from her party and, second, they must react to this behavior in a meaningful way. A robust assessment of whether these conditions hold, then, requires: (1) measures of individuals' own preferences with respect to major roll-call votes taken by Congress; (2) measures of how citizens perceive their legislators to have voted on these issues considered by Congress; and (3) measures of citizens' approval of and vote choices for their legislators (Ansolabehere and Jones 2010, 585; see also Stone 1979).

While there are a considerable number of studies that contain the first and third components necessary for assessing whether the two conditions I have outlined are met (e.g., Achen 1978; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Clinton 2006; Erikson 1978, 1990; Franklin 1991; Miller and Stokes 1963; Nyhan et al. 2012), there is far less scholarship that contains measures of citizens' *perceptions* of how their legislators voted on a given issue. Moreover, the few studies that *have* used data meeting all these criteria have been limited to single roll-call votes (see, for instance, Alvarez and Gronke [1996], who look at the 1991 vote by the U.S. House of Representatives to authorize force in the Persian Gulf; Wilson and Gronke [2000], who analyze the U.S. House vote on President Bill Clinton's 1994 crime bill; and Wolpert and Gimpel [1997], who examine perceptions of senators' behavior on then-Judge Clarence Thomas's 1991 confirmation vote to the U.S. Supreme Court).

The one notable exception, however, is an article by Ansolabehere and Jones (2010) in which the authors use 2005 data from the MIT Public Opinion Research Training Lab (PORTL), as well as the Harvard/MIT Module of the 2006 CCES, both of which contain *several* U.S. House roll-call votes for the three metrics proscribed above. Namely, voters are asked how they would have come down on a total (across the two studies) of 10 specific roll calls taken by the House, how they believe their own House member to have voted on each of these issues, and to rate their approval of their current House member, as well as to indicate whether they voted for or planned to vote for this incumbent in the 2006 election. Using these data, the authors find that individuals' perceptions of House members' voting track well with the reality of how House members actually vote and, in turn, allow citizens to make informed approval evaluations and vote choices with respect to their representatives.

While Ansolabehere and Jones's (2010) study offers an excellent examination of dyadic representation in general, its fundamental objective differs greatly from that of this article. Specifically, while the goal of their article is to assess whether citizens are able to hold MCs accountable for the actions that they take while in office, this article instead aims to evaluate the extent to which legislators realize a payoff and/or incur a penalty from voters for deviating from the party line. In other words, I am less interested in democratic accountability per se and more interested in what the incentives of senators are given the data that I observe.

In the next section, I discuss the data that this article employs and how it *does* lend itself to assessing how voters react to party-deviating behavior by legislators. I also discuss the research design for conducting my empirical analyses.

Data and Research Design

To systematically assess the key research questions I investigate, the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) Common Content data (Ansolabehere 2010) proves for several reasons to be an ideal vehicle by which to assess the degree to which citizens correctly perceive party-conforming, as opposed to party-deviating, legislative behavior as well as the extent to which senators receive a payoff and/or penalty when they decide to defect from their party on a particular issue. Similar to the 2005 data from PORTL and the Harvard/MIT Module of the 2006 CCES, respondents are asked about how they would have voted on seven particular issues that were brought before the Senate, six of which were considered in the 109th Congress (2005–06) and one of which was considered in the 108th Congress (2003–04):¹ the partial-birth abortion ban (“PBA Ban”); a bill authorizing federal funding for stem-cell research (“Stem Cell \$”); an amendment to the 2005 defense funding bill that would have required President George W. Bush’s administration to provide benchmarks for the withdrawal of active-duty American combat troops from Iraq (“Iraq”); final passage of the Senate’s version of a comprehensive immigration reform plan that provided a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants (“Imm.”); an increase in the federal minimum wage (“Min. Wage”); a reduction in the capital gains tax rate (“Cap. Gains”); and, finally, ratification of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”).

Respondents are also asked how they *believe* each of their two senators voted on each of these seven measures. Given that the issues on which respondents are queried are indeed taken from actual roll calls, responses can be objectively coded as falling into one of three categories: (1) Correct; (2) Don't Know; and (3) Incorrect.

Another desirable and for the purposes of this study—critical property of the data I use is that all seven of the roll-call votes about which respondents are queried are “party votes”—those on which a majority of Republicans lined up against a majority of Democrats. Because of this, each senator can be clearly identified on each issue as having voted “with” her party or “against” her party. Table 1 displays the party breakdown on each of the seven roll-call votes. As we see, the number of deviating senators on any given vote ranges from six (in the case of the capital gains tax cut vote) to 26 (in the case of the immigration vote). Thus, while all of these votes are ones in which a majority of one party voted against the majority of the other party, they are also all ones on which *some* senators chose to depart from their party. To reiterate, then, for each issue, senators are categorized as falling into one of two types: (1) party conforming (or party-line voting) and (2) party deviating.

Unit of Analysis and Excluded Respondents

The unit of analysis I employ in this article is one of senator-issue-respondent. To explain, because each respondent has two senators and because there are seven issues on which respondents are questioned, this means that each respondent is observed as many as ($2 \times 7 = 14$) times in the data. When we consider the subsample of our data comprising only Senate *voters*, the respondents who are included (those residing in a state in which a sitting U.S. Senator is seeking re-election under the label of one of the two major parties and faces a challenger from the opposite party) are only voting for one senator and thus can be observed up to ($1 \times 7 = 7$) times in the data. Senator-issue-respondent observations for which the respondent did not, for that issue, take a position (i.e., stated “don't know” when asked how he or she himself or herself would have voted) are omitted from analysis; similarly, senator-respondent observations for which the respondent stated “don't know” when asked whether he approves of his senator are also excluded,² as are Senate voters who did not participate in

TABLE 1
Party Divisions on Key U.S. Senate Roll Calls

Vote by Party	Issue						
	PBA Ban	Stem Cell \$	Iraq	Immigration	Min. Wage	Cap. Gains	CAFTA
Republicans	47-3	19-36	1-52	22-32	7-46	51-3	43-12
Democrats	17-31	44-1	39-6	40-4	45-0	3-41	12-33
Total	64-34	63-37	40-58	62-36	52-46	54-44	55-45
# Deviating Sens.	20	20	7	26	7	6	24

Note. Number of yes votes always provided first.

the election or who opted for a minor-party candidate. Finally, in our analysis of vote choice, senator-issue-respondent observations for which the senator abstained from voting on the issue at hand (or was not a member of the Senate at the time of the vote) are dropped from analysis.

The CCES survey asks respondents to identify their party affiliation on a seven-point scale. Because the main interest of this article is how *partisan* constituents react to party-deviating behavior, as opposed to how constituents not affiliated with a party to begin with might respond, I exclude from analysis respondents who identify as “pure independent,”³ which is a relatively small proportion of the survey sample anyhow: about 10%. Subsequently, I collapse the seven-point scale into a dichotomous measure such that respondents are identified as being either Democratic or Republican, regardless of the strength of their partisan attachment. With previous research suggesting that independent leaners behave very much like strong partisans (see, for instance, Bartels 2000; Greene 2000; Miller 1991; Niemi, Wright, and Powell 1987), such an empirical strategy not only makes analyzing the effect of shared partisanship with one’s senator more tractable but is also theoretically justified.

Further, because my analysis is premised on the notion that citizens are correctly informed about the party affiliation of their senators, I also exclude respondents who did not know or were incorrect when asked to identify the party to which each of their senators belonged.⁴ Across all senator-respondent observations, of which there are, prior to my exclusions being implemented, (36,421 initial CCES respondents \times 2 senators each) = 72,842, a relatively modest 18% either did not know or were specifically incorrect about their senator’s party affiliation. When such restrictions—the exclusion of pure independents, those who do not know or are incorrect about their senator’s party affiliation—are made, the number of unique respondents drops from 36,421 to 27,710. As such, even with these various exclusions, there remains a substantial number of respondents on whom I am able to conduct analysis.

Just as I do with senators, I can also classify respondents as taking their party’s position or taking the position opposite that of their own party.

Therefore, the first way in which I divide respondents is by whether they take their own party’s position (those who do so are classified as taking their party’s “orthodox” position; those

who do not are categorized as taking the “unorthodox” position relative to their own party) on an issue. In addition, because this article is interested in how copartisan constituents and opposite-party constituents differ in how they perceive and react to senators’ roll behavior, respondents are further divided based upon whether they are of the same or the opposite party of the senator they are evaluating.

Each senator-issue-respondent observation, then, can be classified as one of four types: (1) orthodox copartisan; (2) unorthodox copartisan; (3) orthodox out-partisan; and (4) unorthodox out-partisan.

When a senator deviates from the party line, orthodox out-partisans will be in agreement with that senator’s position while orthodox copartisans will disagree. Given that this article is focused on how these two types of constituents react to a senator who breaks from her party on an issue, my analysis is confined to these two groups and does not examine unorthodox copartisans or unorthodox out-partisans.

Table 2 shows that regardless of whether we consider the sample comprising all senators (which I employ when analyzing approval as my dependent variable) or that comprising only

TABLE 2
Composition of Senator-Issue-Respondent Types

Senator-Issue Respondent Type	Senator Voted Party Line	Senator Deviated
All Senators		
Orthodox Copartisan	43%	37%
Unorthodox Copartisan	12%	15%
Orthodox Out-Partisan	35%	36%
Unorthodox Out-Partisan	10%	12%
<i>N</i>	275,260	38,980
Only Senators Running for Re-Election		
Orthodox Copartisan	44%	35%
Unorthodox Copartisan	10%	16%
Orthodox Out-Partisan	36%	39%
Unorthodox Out-Partisan	10%	10%
<i>N</i>	77,860	11,240

Note. Top panel only includes respondents for whom predicted probabilities of senator approval are calculated. Bottom panel only includes respondents for whom predicted probabilities of senate vote choice are calculated.

senators running for re-election (which I employ when analyzing vote choice for the incumbent as my dependent variable), more than three-quarters of senator-issue-respondents are orthodox partisans of some sort (either copartisan or out-partisan).

Condition One: Do Citizens Notice When Senators Deviate from the Party Line?

I begin by evaluating whether the first condition required for party-deviating behavior to be impactful holds—that is, that at least some citizens are able to discern such actions on the parts of legislators. Given the overwhelming evidence that most Americans are not sufficiently interested in politics to expend the time and energy it takes to become fully informed (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), many scholars have shown that citizens instead use smaller pieces of information as shortcuts or cues to make inferences and decisions about politics (e.g., Boudreau 2009; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991), with party being a particularly popular and salient cue that citizens use (Lau and Redlawsk 2001, 2006). As such, it might be the case that when citizens evaluate how their senators voted, they think about the position that they believe the senator’s party to hold on the issue and infer this to be the position of the senator (see, for instance, Dancy and Sheagley 2016). This would suggest that there should be a greater percentage of incorrect guesses and possibly “don’t know” responses when a senator deviates from the party line.

Pooled Sample of Orthodox Copartisans and Orthodox Out-Partisans

As mentioned previously, for each issue, our analysis focuses only on respondents who take their own party’s position. For each of our seven issues, as well as for all issues combined, Table 3 displays for each roll-call condition (“Party Conforming” and “Party Deviating”) the percentage of such respondents who correctly identify their senator’s vote, the percentage who state that they do not know how the senator voted on the issue, and the percentage who are incorrect in regards to their senator’s vote.⁵ Moreover, the top panel displays accuracy rates for all party-conforming citizens in our sample, while the lower panel confines

TABLE 3
 Constituents' Knowledge of Senator's Vote by Senator's Partisan Behavior (Orthodox Copartisans & Orthodox Out-Partisans)

Senator Voted...	Issue										Combined	
	PBA Ban	Stem Cell \$	Iraq	Immigration	Min. Wage	Cap. Gains	CAFTA					
<i>All Senators</i>												
<i>With Party</i>												
Correct	73%	79%	75%	68%	74%	77%	59%				73%	
Incorrect	8%	3%	7%	5%	6%	3%	9%				6%	
Don't Know	19%	18%	18%	25%	20%	20%	32%				21%	
<i>N</i>	29,835	32,036	38,870	24,963	34,070	36,407	19,130				215,311	
<i>Against Party</i>												
Correct	26%	25%	18%	29%	20%	10%	19%				23%	
Incorrect	35%	50%	61%	40%	56%	65%	42%				48%	
Don't Know	29%	25%	21%	31%	24%	25%	39%				29%	
<i>N</i>	1,819	6,490	2,381	7,583	2,567	2,438	4,985				28,263	
<i>Only Senators</i>												
Running for												
Re-Election												
<i>With Party</i>												
Correct	77%	83%	79%	70%	80%	78%	61%				77%	
Incorrect	7%	3%	6%	7%	4%	3%	8%				5%	
Don't Know	16%	14%	15%	23%	16%	19%	31%				18%	
<i>N</i>	9,738	9,162	10,465	7,907	8,966	9,919	5,548				61,705	
<i>Against Party</i>												
Correct	37%	17%	17%	19%	9%	12%	19%				16%	
Incorrect	35%	62%	60%	48%	71%	61%	39%				57%	
Don't Know	28%	21%	23%	33%	20%	27%	42%				27%	
<i>N</i>	372	1,656	1,119	1,310	1,460	1,170	1,302				8,389	

Note. Because each state has two senators, *N* for the full sample of senators is the total number of senator-respondent observations. Percentages are calculated using CCES survey weights.

analysis to orthodox partisan voters who are evaluating a senator who is facing re-election, with those not up for re-election excluded.

As we see, citizens do a much better job at identifying party-conforming behavior than they do at identifying party-deviating behavior. Perhaps the most extreme illustration of this pattern occurs on the capital gains tax cut vote. On this issue, for the full sample, when a senator votes in line with her party, 77% of respondents are correctly able to identify the senator's roll-call position. When a senator deviates from her party, however, the percentage of respondents who can correctly identify this vote drops precipitously to a mere 10%. The other issues, too, however, display a similar pattern. If we exclude CAFTA, then for no roll-call vote does the percentage of respondents correctly identifying party-conforming behavior drop below 76%. Meanwhile, for no issue at all does the percentage of respondents who are able to correctly identify party-deviating behavior exceed 26%.

If we look at the percentage of respondents providing positively *incorrect* assessments as to how their senator voted on a particular roll call, we see that it never even reaches double digits when a senator has voted with her party. Yet when a senator deviates from the party line, we find that for no issue does the proportion of incorrect assessments by citizens drop below 35%. For many of the issues, the proportion is substantially higher, even exceeding 60% for two of the issues (withdrawal from Iraq and the capital gains tax cut) that respondents are asked about.

When all seven issues are pooled together, 73% of respondents across all senators are able to correctly state that the senator voted in line with her party when she has done so, while a mere 6% wrongly believe the senator to have voted contra her own party. Yet, when a senator departs from her party on an issue, less than one-quarter of respondents (23%, to be exact) are able to correctly identify such behavior, while nearly half (48%) actually persist in believing that the deviating senator in fact is in line with her party's position anyhow.

The lower panel of Table 3, as discussed earlier, restricts analysis to the sample of actual senate *voters*, which means that only respondents to the roll-call voting behavior of senators who are facing re-election are included. The reasons for including such subsample analysis are two-fold. First, it may be the case that citizens simply know more about senators who were actively having to engage with the electorate in the year that this survey was

fielded than they would about a senator not facing re-election that year. Second, these figures are required to calculate the effects that roll-call knowledge has on *vote choice* rather than just approval, as we will do in the next section.

In any event, with respect to the case in which a senator casts a party-conforming vote, the results in the lower panel are generally similar to those shown in the upper panel. Specifically, there is no distinct pattern whereby voters are more or less likely to be correct or incorrect about the roll-call behavior of senators who are facing re-election relative to all senators serving in the chamber. When a senator deviates from the party line, however, we see that the subsample of citizens evaluating only a senator who is up for re-election actually show even *less* of an ability to identify party-deviating roll-call positions than does the sample as a whole. The pattern that is most notable, however, is that regardless of which sample we examine, orthodox partisan voters are in fact impressively capable, relative to what previously mentioned research about political knowledge in the mass public tells us, of identifying how a senator has voted when that senator has sided with a majority of her own party but far less adept at doing so when the senator has chosen to side against a majority of her own party.

Having said this, it is worth noting that when we look at accuracy rates for party-deviating behavior and compare them to shows accuracy rates for party-conforming behavior, they are *not* mirror images of one another. For instance, looking at the full sample displayed in the top panel, when a senator votes with her party on stem-cell research funding, only 3% think that she actually took the position contrary to her own party. At the same time, however, when a senator in fact *does* vote against her party on stem-cell research funding, we see that 25% of respondents guess this way—greater than the 5% who did so in the party-conforming condition. Or, for instance, on the immigration reform vote, 68% of respondents represented by a senator who voted with their party on the legislation make the assumption that the senator did so, while a smaller 40% *wrongly* assume a party-deviating senator to have done this when of course in reality she has deviated from her party. This suggests that senators to at least some extent are able to get across to constituents that they have deviated on an issue. Were this not the case, then citizens would be guessing about party-deviating senators in exactly the same percentages as they assess party-conforming senators.

To sum up, it is clear from our results that on the one hand, citizens are much better at identifying party-conforming roll-call behavior than they are at pinpointing party-deviating roll-call behavior. Largely, citizens are cueing off party to infer how their senators voted, and most do not know when a senator has deviated. That being said, there is evidence that at least *some* citizens, although not many, do notice when a senator deviates from the party line.

Orthodox Out-Partisans vs. Orthodox Copartisans: How Does Their Knowledge Vary?

The next question worth addressing is whether and how the orthodox out-partisans differ from orthodox copartisans in terms of the rates at which they correctly or incorrectly perceive the roll-call voting behavior of their senators.

Tables 4 and 5 display the knowledge of orthodox out-partisans and orthodox copartisans, respectively. A comparison of the two tables reveals some clear patterns. First, while both groups are quite adept at correctly identifying how senators came down on various issues when these senators voted with a majority of their own parties, orthodox out-partisans do so at consistently higher rates than their orthodox copartisan counterparts. Specifically, when all issues are pooled together for the full sample of all senators, the former group correctly identifies party-conforming roll-call votes at an overall rate of 78%, while the latter group does so at a rate of 69%, signifying a 9-point gap between the two groups. Similarly, when the sample is restricted to senators running for re-election, we see a difference (in the same direction) of 10 points between the two groups.

Yet interestingly, when a senator deviates from her party on a particular issue, the differences in the rates of correct knowledge of orthodox out-partisans relative to orthodox copartisans are reversed. To explain, when we look at the full sample of senators, orthodox copartisans are more alert to party-deviating roll-call behavior than are orthodox out-partisans; 27% of those belonging to the first group correctly identifying such votes but only 19% of those comprising the second group doing so, making for an 8-point difference. On top of this, orthodox copartisans are more likely than orthodox out-partisans to state that they do not know how a senator voted when she defies her party on an issue;

TABLE 4
 Constituents' Knowledge of Senator's Vote by Senator's Partisan Behavior (Orthodox Out-Partisans)

Senator Voted...	Issue										Combined	
	PBA Ban	Stem Cell \$	Iraq	Immigration	Min. Wage	Cap. Gains	CAFTA					
All Senators												
<i>With Party</i>												
Correct	79%	83%	79%	77%	76%	83%	66%	78%				
Incorrect	7%	3%	7%	5%	7%	3%	8%	6%				
Don't Know	14%	14%	14%	18%	17%	13%	26%	16%				
<i>N</i>	13,215	13,983	17,940	11,647	15,197	16,931	9,441	98,354				
<i>Against Party</i>												
Correct	19%	23%	17%	20%	17%	8%	19%	19%				
Incorrect	55%	55%	67%	49%	60%	73%	49%	56%				
Don't Know	26%	22%	16%	21%	24%	19%	32%	25%				
<i>N</i>	1,103	3,725	1,132	3,085	1,705	1,279	2,024	14,053				
Only Senators												
Running for												
Re-Election												
<i>With Party</i>												
Correct	82%	87%	84%	78%	82%	86%	68%	82%				
Incorrect	6%	3%	5%	5%	6%	3%	8%	5%				
Don't Know	12%	10%	11%	16%	13%	11%	24%	13%				
<i>N</i>	4,454	3,917	4,808	3,715	3,691	4,629	2,626	27,840				
<i>Against Party</i>												
Correct	30%	17%	18%	15%	7%	8%	19%	14%				
Incorrect	44%	66%	63%	59%	75%	69%	50%	64%				
Don't Know	26%	17%	19%	26%	18%	23%	31%	22%				
<i>N</i>	214	929	539	646	950	633	545	4,456				

Note. Because each state has two senators, *N* for the full sample of senators is the total number of senator-respondent observations. Percentages are calculated using CCES survey weights.

TABLE 5
 Constituents' Knowledge of Senator's Vote by Senator's Partisan Behavior (Orthodox Copartisans)

Senator Voted...	Issue										Combined	
	PBA Ban	Stem Cell \$	Iraq	Immigration	Min. Wage	Cap. Gains	CAFTA					
All Senators												
<i>With Party</i>												
Correct	68%	75%	72%	61%	73%	71%	52%				69%	
Incorrect	9%	4%	6%	8%	9%	4%	9%				6%	
Don't Know	23%	21%	21%	31%	22%	25%	39%				25%	
<i>N</i>	16,620	18,053	20,390	13,316	18,873	19,476	9,689				116,957	
<i>Against Party</i>												
Correct	36%	28%	20%	35%	27%	14%	19%				27%	
Incorrect	29%	44%	55%	34%	48%	55%	36%				40%	
Don't Know	36%	28%	25%	31%	25%	31%	44%				33%	
<i>N</i>	716	2,765	1,249	4,498	862	1,159	2,961				14,210	
Only Senators Running for Re-Election												
<i>With Party</i>												
Correct	72%	81%	76%	63%	78%	72%	54%				72%	
Incorrect	8%	3%	6%	8%	3%	3%	9%				6%	
Don't Know	20%	16%	18%	29%	18%	25%	37%				22%	
<i>N</i>	5,284	5,245	5,657	4,192	5,275	5,290	2,922				33,865	
<i>Against Party</i>												
Correct	45%	16%	17%	22%	12%	15%	19%				18%	
Incorrect	25%	57%	57%	39%	62%	53%	32%				48%	
Don't Know	30%	27%	26%	39%	26%	32%	49%				34%	
<i>N</i>	158	727	957	664	510	537	757				3,933	

Note. Because each state has two senators, *N* for the full sample of senators is the total number of senator-respondent observations. Percentages are calculated using CCES survey weights.

when we pool across all seven of the issues, we see an 8-point difference in the full sample and a 12-point difference in the sample featuring re-election-seeking senators only.

As a result, the percentage of orthodox out-partisans who are explicitly incorrect about how a party-deviating senator has voted is substantially greater than the percentage of orthodox copartisans who fall into this category. When we pool across all seven issues in the full sample of senators, the gap is 16 percentage points, with 56% of orthodox out-partisans believing that a party-deviating senator in fact voted with her party but a smaller (although still substantial) 40% of orthodox copartisans holding such perceptions.

Overall, while both orthodox out-partisans and orthodox copartisans are by and large unlikely to notice when a senator from their state deviates from the party line, the latter group whose members disagree with such an action is in fact more likely to notice than is the former group whose members agree with such an action. As I discuss in subsequent sections, this has important consequences in limiting the electoral benefit that senators are able to receive from orthodox copartisan voters but enhances the penalty to job approval that the senator incurs among orthodox out-partisans.

Condition Two: Does Knowing About Party-Deviating Behavior Influence Approval and Vote Choice?

Modeling Approval and Vote Choice

Having shown that our first condition has been *minimally* met, we now move to assess the second condition required for party-deviating behavior to have discernible impact, which is that citizens who are aware of this behavior must meaningfully update their preferences in response to it. In order to examine whether this is the case, I run a series of split-sample linear probability models (LPMs)⁶ (reported in Appendix B in the online supporting information), with separate models for orthodox out-partisans and orthodox copartisans across two different dependent variables, the first of which is whether a respondent approves or disapproves of his senator (1 if respondent approves; 0 if respondent disapproves; missing if respondent answers “don’t

know”), and the second of which is whether a respondent casts a vote in favor of his incumbent senator⁷ (1 if the respondent votes for the incumbent; 0 if the respondent votes for the opposite-party challenger; missing if the respondent abstains or votes for a minor-party candidate). Thus, there are a total of four different regression models, which, once again, are reported in Appendix B in the online supporting information.

For both models, the main independent variables are: (1) whether the senator deviated from her party on the vote (1 if the senator deviated; 0 if the senator voted with her party; missing if senator was not serving at the time of the vote or abstained from a particular vote) and (2) a covariate for knowledge of the roll-call vote that is broken out into categorical dummies, with one indicator variable for whether a respondent was incorrect about how his senator voted (1 if incorrect; 0 if else) and another indicator variable for whether a respondent did not know one way or the other how his senator voted on an issue (1 if he or she does not know; 0 if else) (the omitted category of knowledge, then, is when a respondent is correct).⁸

From the LPMs I have outlined above (and that are, once again, displayed in Appendix B in the online supporting information), I generate predicted probabilities of senator approval for respondents, as well as predicted vote choice for the incumbent for respondents, conditional on whether they agree with their senator, whether they share the senator’s party label, whether the senator deviated on a particular vote, and whether the respondent was either correct, incorrect, or claimed not to know with respect to how his senator voted on the issue at hand.

As was discussed at length previously in this article, the unit of analysis in the model is one of senator-issue-respondent. In order to better elucidate the structure of my data, Table C1 in Appendix C in the online supporting information offers an example of what data for a fictionalized but typical CCES respondent might look like across 14 respondent-issue-senator observations for that respondent. Readers are encouraged to consult Appendix C in order to understand which variables can and cannot vary across a single unique respondent within our data.

Because my observations are hierarchical on the level of respondent, issue, and senator, the LPM I employ clusters its standard errors by each individual respondent, accounting for the fact that nearly all appear more than once in the data; additionally, in order to capture the surely unmeasurable idiosyncrasies of

individual lawmakers, fixed effects dummies for individual senators are included but not reported.⁹ Because we should expect both specific senators being evaluated by individual respondents to correlate with the individual-level covariates, namely, a voter's knowledge of how a particular senator voted (for instance, some senators might do more to publicize their votes than others), a fixed effects model is the appropriate estimator over a random effects model, as the latter makes the assumption that these variables are uncorrelated—surely untenable in the context of our data (see Greene 2011).

Finally, to conclude discussion of my research design, it should be noted that for many—probably most—citizens, it is unlikely that agreement on any *single* issue taken in isolation will be the only one that associates with legislator approval and vote choice. It seems much more plausible that a citizen might judge his legislator on her overall record across a *host* of issues. Thus, the assumption that each issue might *to some degree* be associated with legislator approval and vote choice is not a demanding assumption to make in the context of this study.¹⁰

Having outlined the structure of my data and the models used to predict individuals' approval of senators, I now proceed to assess the degree to which the second condition necessary for party-deviating roll-call behavior to be beneficial (or, as mentioned before, possibly detrimental) to senators is in fact met. In other words, do respondents meaningfully care when a senator deviates from the party line?


Orthodox Out-Partisan Respondents

We begin our analysis by examining patterns of knowledge about party-conforming and party-deviating roll-call behavior and how it correlates with approval and vote choice for orthodox out-partisans, as shown in Table 4 and Figure 1(a) and (b), respectively. Orthodox out-partisans are the core constituency that we assume a senator is trying to win over when she deviates from the party line, as such respondents should view *favorably* an opposite-party senator's deviation and will be displeased when an opposite-party senator votes in alignment with her own party's position.


As mentioned in the previous section, orthodox out-partisan respondents are *less* likely than orthodox copartisans to know

FIGURE 1

(a) Senator Approval by Roll-Call Vote Knowledge. (b) Vote Choice for Incumbent Senator by Roll-Call Vote Knowledge



(a)



(b)

when an opposite-party senator has deviated from the party line. The percentage of respondents who can correctly identify this type of roll-call behavior ranges from a low of 8% for senators who deviate on the capital gains tax cut vote to a high of a still-dismal 23% when a senator deviates on the stem-cell research vote. When we pool knowledge across issues, we find that less than one-in-five orthodox out-partisan respondents are able to pinpoint party-deviating behavior by their opposite-party senators. These results suggest that senators who deviate from the party line with the objective of making this subconstituency happy face an uphill battle in doing so at the outset.

With these numbers in mind, let us now examine how orthodox out-partisans who *do* know about a senator's party-deviating behavior react relative to their counterparts who are unaware of this fact. Looking at Figure 2(a), we find that respondents who know have about a 52% probability of approving of a party-deviating senator from the opposite party, which is a full 35 points higher than the estimated 17% of orthodox out-partisans who wrongly believe a deviating senator has voted with her party. When we look at Table 2, we find that orthodox out-partisan constituents comprise an overall 36% of a deviating senator's constituents when we consider all respondent-senator-issue observations, and, from Table 4, that an overall 19% are aware of the party-deviating behavior.


Extrapolating from these numbers, we can infer that awareness of a senator's party-deviating behavior among this subset adds about 2.5 percentage points to a senator's overall approval rating. While the increase in approval accrued by party-deviating senators among orthodox out-partisans who know about these actions, then, is impressive when taken in isolation, once we calculate the overall increase, it is quite underwhelming.

Moreover, for any constituents from the opposite party as their senator, approval is arguably a symbolic measure. As I discuss in the next section when examining orthodox copartisan respondents, there is a case to be made that approval of a senator among this subgroup might matter due to the fact that they make up a considerable portion of the constituency upon which a senator must rely when seeking renomination. For opposite-party constituents, I argue, general-election vote choice is the more important outcome variable to consider.


In this vein, we now proceed to examine how knowledge of party-deviating roll-call behavior might increase the propensity of

FIGURE 2

(a) Senator Approval by Roll-Call Vote Knowledge. (b) Vote Choice for Incumbent Senator by Roll-Call Vote Knowledge



(a)



(b)

orthodox out-partisan respondents to cross over and support the re-election of an opposite-party senator. Looking at Figure 2(b), we see that knowing that a senator deviated from the party line on an issue bumps one's probability of voting for that senator up to about 30%, considerably higher than the mere 6% probability for orthodox out-partisan constituents who wrongly believe their opposite-party senator to have voted with her party. However, when we account for the fact that among orthodox out-partisan senate voters, only 14% can accurately state when an opposite-party senator has deviated from the party line, combined with the fact that orthodox out-partisans make up 39% of a re-election-seeking senator's constituents and display a 24-point increase in their probability of voting for their opposite-party senator, we now arrive at an overall vote share increase for this senator that is less than 1.5 percentage points. Thus, while it would be an exaggeration to say that a senator receives *zero* payoff among opposite-party/party-line constituents when she deviates from her party, the number is substantively quite small.

It is also worth pointing out that when a senator deviates from the party line, the vast majority of orthodox out-partisan respondents who persist in believing the senator has voted with her party do not behave in a markedly different way from the orthodox out-partisan respondents who *have* correctly perceived a senator who voted the party line as having done so. For instance, when calculating predicted probabilities of giving a cross-over vote to an opposite-party incumbent senator, we find orthodox out-partisan respondents who incorrectly believe a deviating senator to have voted with her party have a 6.3% probability of voting for that senator, while the same type of respondents who are able to correctly state that an opposite-party senator who voted with her party in fact did so have a similar probability of 4.3% of crossing over to vote for the incumbent; not surprisingly, the 95% confidence intervals around these predicted probabilities overlap.

When all of these findings about orthodox out-partisan constituents are taken together, the major point at which we arrive is clear: While senators may believe that they can gain a great deal of ground among these voters by opposing their party on a high-profile issue, the general-election payoff that they actually gain among orthodox out-partisans who agree with their deviation from the party is, while not entirely null, nonetheless substantively small. Ultimately, it seems as if very few of these constituents are going to realize when an opposite-party senator deviates

from her party, and while the increased probabilities in approval and vote choice among the small subset who do know about the senator's vote may look impressive on the surface, we find that once we account for how much of an *overall* increase in approval rating and vote share that this actually buys a deviating senator, it is quite minimal.

Orthodox Copartisan Respondents

Next, we examine how orthodox copartisan respondents respond to senators who deviate from the party line in terms of their approval and vote choice probabilities. Importantly, because these respondents hew to their *own* party's position on an issue, they should be displeased when a same-party senator breaks from her party on that issue. As outlined in the examination of whether our first condition (whether citizens actually notice when a senator deviates from the party line), we see that relative to their orthodox out-partisan counterparts, orthodox copartisan constituents are more likely to notice party-deviating behavior by their senators. Specifically, recall that for orthodox out-partisans within the full sample of senators, the overall percentage who are able to spot party-deviating roll-call behavior by a senator was 19%; for orthodox copartisan respondents, this figure is 8 points higher for a total of 27%. This is especially notable given that when a senator deviates from the party line, "don't know" responses among orthodox copartisans are also 8 points higher than they are among orthodox out-partisans, a 16-point difference.

What does this mean, then, for approval among this subgroup of citizens? Looking at Figure 2a, we see that there is a precipitous drop in approval when we move from an orthodox copartisan who wrongly believes his or her party-deviating copartisan senator has voted with her party on a particular issue to a citizen from the same subgroup who correctly notices that his or her copartisan senator did in fact break from her party. Specifically, the former respondent has an 88% probability of approving of such a senator, while the latter type of respondent's predicted probability of approving is only 52%—quite low given the senator shares the respondent's party label.

The implications of this 36-point drop in approval among orthodox copartisan constituents who know about a copartisan

senator's deviation from her party are somewhat different than for the increase in approval that a senator realizes among orthodox out-partisan constituents when she deviates from the party line. To explain, while our quantity of interest with the latter group was the *overall* increase in a senator's approval rating, with the former group we examine in this section, the quantity of interest should be the overall size of the approval decrease a senator receives *among orthodox copartisans alone*. As such, approval among orthodox copartisans taken in isolation is, I argue, a critical number that a senator must worry about due to the potential threat of receiving a primary challenge in the next election cycle in which his or her seat comes up. Orthodox copartisans will make up the core of a senator's primary electorate and so is a group about which she must worry.

When calculating the approval decrease among orthodox copartisan constituents in the way that we do, it is irrelevant that this typology of respondent makes up 37% of a deviating senator's constituency (see Table 2). Rather, we consider only that, when pooled across all seven issues, 27% of same-party/party-line constituents are aware of a senator's decision to deviate from her party and that among this group, there is a 37-point drop in approval relative to same-party/party-line constituents who do not know that the senator has deviated from her party. Considered this way, we find that knowledge that a senator has deviated engenders a substantial 10-point drop (27% of a 36-point decrease is 10.0) in approval among orthodox copartisans and thus a very real penalty to a senator's standing among this group.

Moving to general-election vote choice, we look at Figure 2b and find that the predicted probabilities of orthodox copartisan voters opting to re-elect their copartisan incumbent senator are always very high—well above 90% at the very least—and do not vary in any meaningful way based upon whether the senator has toed the party line on an issue or, alternatively, departed from her party instead; it also does not matter much whether or not a constituent knows how the senator has behaved. This finding is not surprising in that even the orthodox copartisans who are aware of and displeased with party-deviating behavior in terms of registering their disapproval have little choice but to vote to re-elect the incumbent; the only alternative is to vote for an opposite-party challenger with whom they almost surely disagree on far more issues than the party-deviating incumbent whom they might not particularly like.

Again, however, I argue that for the reasons stated previously relating to primary elections, the critical variable to look at for orthodox copartisans is approval and *not* vote choice. In the former respect, enough orthodox copartisan constituents notice a party-deviating vote by a senator such that the legislator incurs a very real penalty among these voters.

Discussion and Conclusion

This article has demonstrated a few key findings that have important implications for legislators' incentives and the nature of individual partisanship in the modern era. First, when a senator deviates from her party line on a high-profile issue, the proportion of her constituents who notice such a move is very limited.

Second, while the citizens who we might expect to react positively—that is, opposite-party individuals who should be pleased by the legislator's defection and are aware of it—do indeed shift their attitudes and electoral support for such legislators in a substantially positive direction, simply too few of these individuals actually notice such behavior for it to make a difference.

Third, looking at a party-bucking senator's constituents who we expect to receive the senator's deviating behavior negatively—that is, the same-party rank and file who subscribe to party orthodoxy on the issue(s) on which the senator has defected—we find that their approval of the senator exhibits a marked downward shift and, moreover, that while most of the citizens belonging to this subgroup still do not notice this behavior, they are nonetheless more likely to do so than the aforementioned opposite-party constituents who agree with what the senator has done.

Using informed speculation to extrapolate from these data, I posit that this lowered approval among the partisan base upon which a senator must rely for renomination every six years could attract a formidable noncentrist primary challenger.

Taken together, these findings make clear that senators gain minimal net benefit in a general election when they oppose their party on a major issue and raise the possibility that such senators might incur an electoral penalty in the context of a primary challenge.

In terms of what we have seen play out in a variety of Senate elections over the past decade, these findings are supported. An excellent example from the data we examine is that of then Senator Lincoln Chafee (R-RI). Arguably *the* most liberal Republican

serving in the Senate during the early-to-mid 2000s, Chafee was still handily defeated by his Democratic challenger, former State Attorney General Sheldon Whitehouse, in 2006. Interestingly, before Chafee could even train his focus on Whitehouse, the liberal GOP senator had to spend a large amount of energy and financial resources beating back a primary challenge from a conservative Republican who argued that Chafee was too out of step with the GOP to merit renomination (Laffey 2007).

In addition, each election cycle following 2006 has seen at least one senator who made concerted overtures to cast moderate votes on some issues (presumably with the goal of winning over some opposite-party voters) nonetheless go down to defeat in their re-election bids: Norm Coleman (R-MN) and Gordon Smith (R-OR) in 2008; Blanche Lincoln (D-AR) in 2010, who incidentally also, like Chafee, faced a challenge from a noncentrist primary opponent prior to her general-election loss; Scott Brown (R-MA) in 2012; Kay Hagan (D-NC), Mary Landrieu (D-LA), and Mark Pryor (D-AR) in 2014; Kelly Ayotte (R-NH) and Mark Kirk (R-IL) in 2016; and Joe Donnelly (D-IN), Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND), and Claire McCaskill (D-MO) in 2018.

Some counterexamples to these cases might be legislators like Senator Susan Collins (R-ME), a moderate Republican who has continued to be re-elected in a state that typically leans toward the Democratic Party or, on the other side of the aisle, Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV), who has managed to be elected to the Senate three times (2010, 2012, and 2018) from a state that has increasingly tilted towards the Republican Party. Yet when we weigh cases like those of Collins and Manchin against the slew of other Senate moderates who have not been able to survive electorally, the Maine Republican and West Virginia Democrat prove to be much more the exception than the rule.

In addition to shedding light on the strategic incentives of political elites—particularly, elected legislators—this article carries important implications about what citizens know and do not know about their elected representatives, and the results on this front are mixed. On the one hand, our finding that citizens (at the least the subset we examine) can accurately identify party-conforming roll-call behavior at impressively high rates suggests that many are aware of where *most* elites comprising each political party stand on the major issues of the day. On the other hand, given that citizens perform dismally at correctly identifying how party-deviating legislators have voted, it also seems clear that

they are not paying much attention to policy positions of their own specific legislators.

These findings of course beg an important question: Why, then, do electorally marginal senators sometimes choose to deviate from most members of their party on high-profile issues if it doesn't appear to gain them much of an electoral benefit?

For a plausible answer to this question, it is worth revisiting our findings about the opposite-party citizens who *are* aware of a senator's deviation from her party on an issue; the latter point is not a trivial one. Specifically, we found these informed out-partisans are a substantial 26 percentage points more likely than their unaware counterparts to cross over and vote for this opposite-party senator. Ultimately, then, it is not that such a strategy *cannot* potentially benefit an electorally marginal senator's fortunes to deviate from her party. Instead, it is that such a strategy *does not* in practice yield a great deal of electoral payoff due to the low rates at which voters in general and out-partisans in particular notice such party-deviating behavior. Put differently, if more members of the orthodox out-partisan subgroup were actually aware of a senator's deviation from her party on a high-profile issue, then the electoral benefit to bucking one's party could be quite handsome. Thus, it is not an irrational strategy for a senator from an electorally difficult state to opt against her party on a high-profile issue. It just has a fairly limited payoff.

Lastly, a final point worth noting is that the nature of the issues that CCES respondents are asked about raises a couple of interesting points worthy of discussion. To explain, one interesting point to consider as we interpret our results is that most if not all of the seven issues asked about by the CCES are ones that are quite salient. If knowledge about cross-party behavior on *these* issues, then, is limited, it seems that on less-high-profile issues, party-deviating behavior is likely to be even less noticed, which suggests that it is unlikely that in all but the rarest of cases senators will *ever* be likely to handsomely benefit from deviating from the party line.

On the other hand, while it is clear that senators at best are only marginally able to benefit electorally from engaging in this behavior, this does suggest that on more mundane but perhaps important issues that do not garner a great deal of media attention, there might be room for cross-party cooperation in Congress, as the citizens who should be upset by this are unlikely to even notice. In an era of a highly polarized Congress, this could be a

normatively positive implication of the results at which I arrive. Future work may want to examine, then, whether bipartisanship is more likely to occur on less salient issues.

In the meantime, this article has taken an important step towards contributing to our understanding about whether senators are able to profit from casting moderate roll-call votes, and has provided strong evidence that they largely cannot and suggests evidence that the costs might even outweigh the benefits.

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NOTES

1. The one issue considered in the 108th Congress is the partial-birth abortion ban.

2. This does not guarantee, however, that a respondent is dropped from analysis entirely, as he may decline to make an approval evaluation for *one* of his two senators but be willing to evaluate the other of the two senators, allowing half of his senator-issue-respondent observations to remain in the data set.

3. Respondents who answer “independent” to the party-affiliation question of the CCES survey are given a follow-up question asking whether they *lean* towards one particular party or the other but are also given the option to state they do not lean towards one major party or the other. Respondents who persist in answering that they are independent when given the follow-up question are those who we consider “pure independents.”

4. Approval evaluations of respondents who are correct regarding the party of one senator but not the other are retained for the cases in which they evaluate the senator whose party they have correctly identified but dropped for the cases in which they evaluate the senator whose party they did not know or were wrong about.

5. Appendix A (in the online supporting information) includes these results calculated for Democratic and Republican respondents separately and shows that the results are largely similar across respondents from each party, with neither party’s rank-and-file citizens systematically more knowledgeable than the other.

6. Results from probit models are substantively identical. The main reason that I employ an LPM over a probit is that, as I will discuss subsequently, my models include senator-specific as well as issue-specific fixed effects. Fixed effects probit (and logit) models can produce biased estimates, making an LPM more appropriate (see Greene 2011).

7. The sample size for this latter model is necessarily smaller than the sample size for the former, as all respondents have two senators whom they

can evaluate; but with only one-third of the Senate being up for election in any given year and with only one senator from a given state up for re-election at a given time, there are simply fewer respondents as well as respondent-senator-issue observations in the vote-choice model.

8. Of course, whether a respondent agrees with the position a senator takes, as well as whether he or she shares the same party as the senator being evaluated, are also pieces of information necessary for modeling approval and vote choice. That being said, because I run separate models for orthodox copartisan respondents and orthodox partisan respondents, these variables are, given the inclusion of a covariate in each model indicating whether a senator deviated from her party, held constant within each regression model and thus do not need to be (and, mathematically, cannot be) directly included in each linear model.

9. While the particular issue being considered might also be an important factor, including issue dummies alone is not theoretically sensible, as the coefficient estimates could not be meaningfully interpreted. Instead, one would need to include issue-specific dummies *and* interact an indicator for each issue (save for one baseline issue) with the model's other two covariates (whether the senator being evaluated deviated as well as whether a respondent is able to correctly identify a senator's vote) as well as with the two-way interaction between these two covariates (which would thus require a series of triple-interaction terms), creating what would be a computationally intensive set of models requiring me to estimate predicted probabilities of approval and vote choice for each of the seven issues considered.

10. In Appendix D in the online supporting information, I replicate all of the analyses conducted in this article across the seven issues asked about by the CCES survey for the stem-cell research vote alone and CAFTA votes alone, as these are two very different types of issues but ones on which there were a substantial number of deviating senators. Interestingly, the results when these issues are taken in isolation are similar to those we arrive at when all seven issues are pooled together. With each of these votes being as high profile and salient as they are, this may make sense, as knowledge of even one deviation from the party line may cue orthodox out-partisan respondents to become more approving of and more likely to vote for their opposite-party senator, as well as orthodox copartisans to become less approving.

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

Appendix A: Knowledge of Senators' Votes Calculated Separately for Democratic and Republican Respondents

Appendix B: Regression Models Predicting Probability of Approval of and Vote Choice for U.S. Senators by Respondent Type

Appendix C: Illustration of Data Structure

Appendix D: Predicted Probability Plots for Approval of and Vote Choice for U.S. Senators Based on Knowledge of Stem-Cell Research Funding and CAFTA Roll-Call Positions by Respondent Type